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Seeing slow and seeing fast: Two limits on perception 
Abstract 
Video cameras have a single temporal limit set by the frame rate. The human 
visual system has multiple temporal limits set by its various constituent 
mechanisms. These limits appear to form two groups. A fast group comprises 
specialized mechanisms for extracting perceptual qualities such as motion 
direction, depth, and edges. The second group, with coarse temporal resolution, 
includes judgments of the pairing of color and motion, the joint identification of 
arbitrary spatially separated features, the recognition of words, and high-level 
motion. These temporally coarse percepts may all be mediated by high-level 
processes. Working at very different timescales, the two groups of mechanisms 
collaborate to create our unified visual experience. 
Spatial	  versus	  temporal	  scales	  
Our visual system has a spatial grain, making small details completely invisible, 
such as the individual molecules forming the surface you are currently viewing. 
Less appreciated is that our processing of time is also confined to coarse scales. 
Events confined to thousands of a second, and sometimes even hundredths of a 
second or longer, are not perceived. For example, until brief-exposure 
photography was invented in the 1870s, it was not known whether a galloping 
horse lifts all four hooves off the ground at any one time [1]. 
Just as the microscope probed small spatial scales long before stroboscopic 
photography investigated small temporal scales, so vision scientists have 
traditionally concentrated on visionʼs spatial resolution rather than its temporal 
resolution. But recent years have seen an upsurge in interest in temporal 
processing. Much of this growth has been in areas of temporal illusions, such as 
distortions in time perception [2], asynchronies in binding the features of an 
object [3], and possible interactions between object motion and the time an object 
is perceived [4]. Recent reviews of these topics are available [5-7], but missing 
from the literature is a modern synopsis of the temporal limits of vision—the 
timescales on which the machinery of perception operates. These temporal limits 
set the foundation necessary to understand temporal illusions, and in bringing 
together the diverse psychophysical literature on temporal limits, a broad 
generalization emerges regarding the functional organization of the visual 
system. 
Understanding	  multiple	  temporal	  scales	  
Letʼs begin with a naïve question—does your visual experience display the world 
at five, twenty, or one hundred frames per second? In the case of the cinema, we 
know there is a frame rate, a temporal grain of twenty-four per second. But our 
visual system does not operate like movie equipment. Visual processing is more 
continuous	  [8]—although see [9] for the suggestion of a discrete component. In 
continuous processing, although there is no frame rate because discrete 
snapshots are not taken, the system still can be said to have a temporal grain. 
The grain, or temporal interval over which the system blurs information together, 
is known as temporal resolution. A movie camera has one temporal resolution, 
reflecting its frame rate. But the visual system has multiple temporal resolutions.  
The high temporal resolution of some of our perceptual mechanisms presents a 
problem for the cinematographer working with a film shot, as most are, at twenty-
four pictures per second. If films were projected at 24 frames per second, the 
flicker would be obvious and annoying, because our flicker perception 
mechanism is fast enough to detect 24-Hz flicker. To thwart both flicker 
perception and some motion artifacts that our fast motion mechanisms are 
sensitive to, cinema projectors flick each frame on and off twice before moving on 
to the next frame. The resulting 48 per second (48 Hz) flicker rate is almost 
invisible to us. 
Although the technique eliminates the flicker perception problem, one might 
expect other problems to remain. As each object is shown twice in the same 
location before moving on, a cinematic car chase might appear as a stuttering 
procession rather than as the familiar fluid and seamless experience. Fortunately 
for the cinematographer, our visual perception fails to register the stuttering—a 
consequence of the coarse temporal scale at which most perceptual mechanisms 
process the scene. As will be described below, the 24 pictures per second rate is 
already too fast for many of our visual mechanisms. Our perception comprises 
some mechanisms, like flicker and motion, that inform us of rapid changes, while 
others are restricted to much slower changes and thus fooled by a 24 Hz 
simulacrum of reality. 
Two of the temporal limits underpinning experience can be demonstrated with a 
simple animation. In Movie 1, adjacent striped patches alternate between 
leftward-tilted and rightward-tilted. When the alternation rate is only a few per 
second (top row), it is easy to perceive whether the two patches are always 
opposite in orientation (top left) or are always oriented in the same way (top 
right). If the patches are alternated at a faster rate, say between 8 and 12 frames 
per second (second row), it becomes difficult or impossible to judge whether the 
patches have the same orientation or opposite orientations [10]. Interestingly, 
although too fast for the temporal relationship of the two features to be perceived, 
this rate is nevertheless slow enough to identify the two orientations [11] and to 
detect the flicker. Not until the rate is increased much further would the movie 
appear completely fused (bottom row), with neither the relationship of the two 
patches, their individual patterns, nor their flicker perceived.  
Each speed limit likely corresponds to the narrowest temporal scale at which a 
perceptual mechanism operates. Consider the perception of fluorescent lights, 
which illuminate the workdays of most office workers. Fluorescent lights flicker—
120 times per second (120 Hz) in the US and 100 Hz in many other places. We 
do not perceive this flicker because our underlying visual detectors average their 
inputs over a longer interval. Indeed, our visual mechanisms average over 20 
milliseconds or more, blurring together an entire 10-ms cycle of 100 Hz flicker 
and therefore obliterating the changes in luminance in the fluorescent lights and 
in the 48-Hz flicker of the double-projected cinema. 
At first, one might think this integration interval could be revealed by presenting a 
stimulus a single time rather than in a cycle, and determining the shortest 
duration for which it can still be perceived. But a 5-ms stimulus flash, if sufficiently 
high contrast, can be analyzed even by a mechanism that operates at a slow 
100-ms scale, because averaging over 100 ms will not eliminate the stimulus 
information. This point has been key to a debate in the literature on the timescale 
of visual grouping [12].	  The	  alternating	  displays	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  present	  article	  are	  specifically	  designed	  to	  provide	  no	  information	  when	  a	  mechanism	  integrates	  over	  the	  cycle of alternation. Restricting ourselves to such displays will lead us to 
ignore for now (but see Box 1) the interesting literature on the effect of varying 
presentation duration of a single stimulus.  
Although many studies have probed the temporal limits of visual judgments using 
the alternating stimulus technique, because these studies have used very 
different stimuli and tasks, the results usually cannot be compared with 
quantitative precision. However, in some cases the speed limits found differ so 
much that the differences are unlikely to be caused by experiment details. Figure 
1 shows some of these limits. The limits fall into two clusters, slow and fast, 
separated by a large gap.  
Fast	  limits	  on	  visual	  percepts	  
The fast cluster includes flicker perception. The “flicker fusion” limit, like others, 
depends on mean luminance, luminance contrast, and other factors, but is 
usually at least 50 Hz on ordinary computer screens. Only six other types of 
visual judgments have been found to be of comparable speed: 
 • first-order motion: A moving sinusoidal grating with bright peaks and dark 
troughs is seen through a window. Even when its velocity is so high that 30 
of its bright peaks pass each location per second (30 Hz), observers still 
perceive its direction of motion [13]. If the input to motion detectors was 
blurred or jumbled over this timescale, determining the motion direction 
would be impossible. Flicker is a degenerate case of motion and the same 
bank of fast detectors could be responsible for both the motion and flicker 
limits. 
 • depth from binocular disparity: Two identical gratings, one in each eye, are 
viewed through identical windows. One is spatially shifted relative to the 
other, introducing a binocular disparity that is perceived as depth. Even 
when they move at a 30-Hz rate, the depth is still perceived [14]. If the input 
to depth mechanisms were blurred at a >30 ms timescale, detecting the 
depth would be impossible at this rate. 
•   edges and texture boundaries: Against a gray background, a field of white 
dots is adjacent to a field of black dots. Both fields are set in rapid 
alternation between white and black, but out of phase—when one is white, 
the other is black. The conspicuous boundary between them is perceived 
even at fast rates of 30 Hz [15, 16], while at faster rates the black and white 
are averaged by the brain into the same color as the background. Texture 
boundaries defined by orientation differences can also be seen at fast rates 
[11].  
 • binding of color and orientation sharing a spatial location: If a red, right-
tilted patch is alternated with a green, left-tilted patch, it is easy to 
distinguish from the complementary pairing of red left alternating with green 
right, even at fast 20 Hz rates [17] (demo at 
www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/alexh/research/binding/ ) 
• color and orientation as individual features: Fast binding of color and 
orientation could not occur without fast processing of the individual color 
and orientation features. Indeed, the features might be perceived at rates 
even faster than is their pairing [18] although this remains unsettled as the 
slower limit for the pairing could instead be caused by an asynchrony in 
processing of the features. 
 • binding of local orientation elements into a global form: The visual system 
can efficiently integrate hundreds of local oriented elements distributed 
across the visual field into an overall shape, and do so even when rapid 
alternation requires the computation to occur over less than 30 ms [19] 
(demo at http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/colinc/HTML/dynamics.htm ) 
Symmetry judgments of such patterns might be similarly rapid [20]. 
Slow	  limits	  on	  visual	  percepts	  
Measurements of other visual judgments all appear to have yielded much slower 
temporal limits. The pairing of two orientations was one such limit (Movie 1). For 
a variety of features, such pairing or binding judgments are confined to rates less 
than 4 Hz. A stunning example occurs with a field of dots moving back and forth 
behind a window. When the dots change direction, they also change color, 
between black and white (Movie 2). The color-motion pairing (leftward with white 
or with black) is easy to perceive at slow alternation rates, as can be seen in the 
version at top of Movie 2. However, at a faster rate of about 5 alternations per 
second (bottom of Movie 2) it is difficult to perceive the pairing between color and 
motion [21,	  22]	  (even after compensation for a possible asynchrony in feature 
processing [22]),	  although	  this	  rate	  is	  far	  slower	  than	  the	  flicker	  fusion	  rate.	  Many	  observers	  report	  that,	  despite	  an	  inability	  to	  determine	  the	  pairing,	  the	  constituent 
colors and motions are still easily perceived. As in Movie 1, apparently the 
process of pairing visual features takes more time than identifying them.  
Other percepts are confined to similarly slow rates. It is possible that each is 
extracted by a separate process with the similar speed limits only a coincidence. 
A more interesting possibility is that a common, late visual processing stage 
limits the whole lot. This slow-limit group includes: 
• binding of form and color across space: Alternating color-shape pairings can 
only be reported at rates below about 3 Hz [17] (demo at 
www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/alexh/research/binding/).  
 • binding of global form with color: Two specially-constructed dot patterns 
that form distinct shapes alternate, with all the dots of one red and all the 
dots of the other green. At alternation rates faster than several a second it 
is very difficult to determine the shape-color pairing even though the shapes 
and colors themselves are easily identified [19].	  
 • direction change and acceleration perception: A moving stimulus alternates 
between two speeds (acceleration) or two directions. When the alternation 
occurs faster than several per second, these changes are unperceivable [23]	  
 • attention-mediated motion and other forms of higher-order motion: 
Conventional Reichhardt-like motion detectors can only detect a common 
subset of moving stimuli. Other stimuli are thought to reveal a high-level 
motion mechanism possibly controlled by attention [24]	   with a low temporal 
limit [25, 26]. Its 8-10 Hz limit makes it the fastest of this list. 
 • word perception: certain pairs of words (such as "jump" and "pink"), when 
alternated in the same location, cannot be distinguished from another 
matched pair ("junk" and "pimp"; demo at 
www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/alexh/research/words) at rapid rates as one 
perceives only the sum, which is the same for both pairs. They can be 
distinguished only at rates slower than several items per second [27]	  
Explaining	  the	  gap	  
What could account for the gulf (Figure 1) separating the temporal limits of these 
two sets of visual judgments? Possibly this is simply selective reporting (see Box 
1), but there is reason to believe instead that the fast limits reflect specialized 
mechanisms, with the slow limits imposed when a visual representation must be 
constructed by central, possibly attentive processing. This notion of fast 
peripheral processing and slower central processing is an old one [28, 29]. 
However, over the last decade or so the number of established slow limits 
(Figure 1) has doubled. Words, on the low-resolution list, are not recognized until 
inferotemporal cortex [30], and attention-mediated motion and binding of arbitrary 
features are apparently mediated by parietal cortex [31, 32]. Furthermore, some 
of the limits are set by long-range, object-based summation [33] rather than 
retinally local alternation rate or short-range stimulus trajectory [34]. Because 
visual signals probably are not compared with auditory signals until late in the 
sensory processing streams, the finding that audio-visual binding is limited to 4 
Hz [35] is yet another indication that central stages are limited to low frequencies. 
If central stages of processing including visual experience are indeed slow in 
general, then one might wonder how any conscious visual judgment could show 
a fast rate limit. Fortunately, when visual cognition cannot extract information 
because it is confined to rapid rates, fast lower-level mechanisms can create 
labels so that later stages can know what is going on at short timescales. These 
labels are subsequently temporally combined before reaching visual experience. 
This yields a temporally extended object such as a single moving surface [13] or, 
in the case of alternating colored gratings, a transparent display of two seemingly 
simultaneous surfaces ([36], demo at 
http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/alexh/research/transparency/Home.html). But 
with visual cognition thus dependent on specialized mechanisms to inform it of 
high frequency information, much is lost. 
Understanding	  high-­‐level	  visual	  processing	  
The temporal limits of the early stages of vision are typically explained with the 
linear systems concept of temporal blurring used to explain the flicker limit earlier 
in this article [37, 38]. It is uncertain whether the slow limits of high-level visual 
processing can be explained in the same way. The temporal filtering or blurring 
explanation assumes that all information ascending the hierarchy eventually 
makes it to perception. Coarse temporal resolution would cause a stimulus to be 
inappropriately combined with the stimuli that precede and follow it, obliterating 
rapid changes, but nothing is actually discarded. Theories of visual cognition 
propose instead that only some visual representations are transferred to 
cognition, with the rest ignored [39, 40]. 
These twin frameworks, temporal resolution theory and attentional selection, 
rarely coincide in the literature, with the first applied only to low-level temporal 
limits and the second only to higher limits at visual cognition. A rare exception 
has arisen with motion perception, which is present in both our fast and slow list. 
That the form of motion perception mediated by attention [24, 25] appears to 
have a much slower temporal limit, and greater attentional involvement, provides 
evidence for the present theory of a large temporal divide, and some support for 
the use of twin frameworks to explain the high-level limits. 
The discounting of information by attention before cognition is reached is 
commonly experienced when viewing a rapid-cut music video. You might feel you 
have seen and heard many things in the video, but that most went, you might 
say, in one ear and out the other. “Attentional blink” experiments document one 
of the temporal limits involved. In these experiments, participants are asked to 
process two stimuli at different times, much like the attempt to follow the 
succession of brief scenes in the music video. Processing of the second stimulus 
is severely impaired if the first stimulus appeared shortly before. The culprit is 
thought to be a time-consuming stage required to process the first stimulus, such 
as short-term memory consolidation [40],	  or	  one	  required	  to	  switch	  to	  processing	  the second stimulus, such as re-setting of attentional control [41]. 
Could the slow process involved in the attentional blink be the same as that 
which causes the resolution limit to be low for binding widely-separated features 
and for perceiving acceleration? Both limits are probably caused by limits at high-
level processing stages. However the attentional blink requires a first task as a 
trigger, possibly to consume high-level resources, whereas the perceptual limits 
reviewed in this article occur despite the benefit of full resources. The attentional 
blink is substantially more time-consuming than even the slowest visual percept 
reviewed here and might be imposed by a bottleneck or switching limit at a more 
cognitive stage. 
Experiments designed to target specific perceptual processes sometime miss 
and instead reflect low-resolution, high-level processes. Flash-lag experiments, 
designed to measure position perception, have observers report the position of a 
moving object at the time of a sudden flash. The moving object is perceived 
farther along its trajectory than it actually was at the time of the flash, as if the 
visual system actively shifted it. However, the task requires binding the time of 
the flash with the simultaneous position of the moving object, and binding 
separated elements usually has low temporal resolution. Consistent with this, the 
positions reported vary across trials, occupying a 60-70 ms swath of the moving 
objectʼs trajectory [42]. Indeed, at higher velocities this distribution fills a larger 
spatial area, such that the temporal imprecision remains constant (Linares, White 
& Holcombe, 2008 unpublished manuscript). This limit on task performance is 
therefore a process with coarse temporal resolution. Could the coarse binding 
limitation be related to the shift in the direction of motion? Possibly yes (as 
suggested by [7]), since other work on binding motion with a static feature also 
yields a temporal bias—the static feature is perceived as co-occurring with a later 
phase of the motion [3, 43]. Also consistent with a causal role for high-level 
binding is that the flash-lag shift is not evident at mid-level visual mechanisms [44].	  
Summary	  
The title of this article referred to the phenomenon of “seeing fast”, which may 
seem ungrammatical in isolation. But the meaning here is not to see quickly or 
rapidly, but rather to see things that occupy fast timescales. After hitting the 
retina, visual signals rocket towards cortex, and on the way only changes on the 
order of a few milliseconds are lost [45], perhaps due to membrane fluctuations 
and temporal summation of signals at geniculate and geniculo-cortical synapses. 
Shortly after reaching cortex, specialized motion detectors and edge detectors 
cross-correlate the incoming signals, outputting representations of certain events 
at narrow timescales. These specialized, high temporal resolution motion 
detectors and edge detectors are replicated across the visual field. But with a 
high cost in cortical territory to be paid for having these special-purpose 
mechanisms, evolution has provided for only a select set. Visual signals continue 
past the secondary visual cortices and move towards visual cognition, but then 
hit slow going. Visual cognition can make nearly any judgment about its inputs, 
but these computations are so slow that information at narrow timescales cannot 
be accessed if not already explicitly represented by the low-level specialized 
detectors. Making matters worse is that cognition is also limited in resources and 
only able to process one or a few objects at a time. Not all incoming signals can 
then be processed, just as for Lucille Ball in her famous encounter with a fast 
assembly line (http://youtube.com/watch?v=4wp3m1vg06Q). Hapless Lucy was 
told she must box every chocolate on the line; fortunately cognition can afford to 
let many signals just pass it by, with only a few needing its special treatment. 
Attentional selection is usually able to choose a few for further processing and 
discard the rest. But with certain repetitive trains of stimuli, such as in the 
demonstrations of slow limits described in this article, attention is unable to select 
one stimulus and isolate it from succeeding visual representations. In color-
motion binding (Movie 2) for example, the second color and second motion are 
fed into visual cognition at a time when it has only just begun to bind the first pair, 
and our percept remains unbound.  
Vision science has a strong foundation in psychophysics, which can functionally 
identify the early visual stages and their simple filtering properties. But higher 
stages bear little resemblance to simple filters. Up in the clouds of visual 
cognition, as processing becomes more general and flexible, conventional 
psychophysics loses its power. To understand this realm, research should focus 
on the hallmarks of higher-level processes: low capacity managed by a selection 
process, attentional resource demands, and as argued here, limited temporal 
resolution.  
Box 1. A true dichotomy? 
The limits discussed in the main text, and schematized in Figure 1, appear to 
form two distinct groups, slow and fast. This review is intended to be 
comprehensive in reviewing the high-resolution limits, but due to space and 
relevance considerations some limits in the slow group have been omitted, and 
others are yet to be measured. These considerations, and others discussed 
below, leave open the possibility that the suggested dichotomy is not truly 
dichotomous. 
The fast group of limits are not homogeneous, as underscored by the existence 
of the different flicker limits. Flicker between two colors of the same luminance 
(equiluminant flicker) is commonly invisible above about 25 Hz, much slower than 
the 50 Hz typically observed with flicker of white and black. This puts it on the 
slow end of the fast limits reviewed, and the large difference from the luminance 
flicker limit could undermine the idea of the dichotomy between slow and fast 
limits. But when the stimuli are set to similar signal strength by equating cone 
contrast, the flicker limits are not nearly as different [46]. Thus a large difference 
in temporal limit can stem from an unfair comparison rather than a difference in 
the temporal resolution of the underlying mechanisms. This issue must still be 
addressed for many comparisons of temporal limits.  
The divide between slow and fast limits can be partially bridged by distance 
between stimulus elements. Some of the fast temporal limits require identification 
and binding of two simultaneous stimuli. As the visual cortices are retinotopically 
organized, if the binding is to take place within visual cortex then far-flung 
neurons must interact when the stimulus elements are far apart. If signals diffuse 
gradually across cortex, then noise can accumulate and interactions across 
greater distances will be temporally imprecise. Behaviorally, the temporal limit for 
some judgments does decrease with stimulus separation [16].	  As	  signals	  ascend 
the processing hierarchy, receptive field sizes increase until there is little spatial 
selectivity and the neural connectivity distance is less dependent on the spatial 
stimulus separation. Nevertheless one judgment classified here as high-level, the 
same-different judgments of orientation described in the introduction and shown 
in Movie 1, is affected by distance (Motoyoshi 2004). When the oriented 
elements are abutting, whether they are the same orientation or different can be 
perceived at rates as high as 8 Hz, whereas once they are a few degrees apart 
as in the movie, the judgment is impossible above 4-5 Hz. Perhaps the relevant 
computation is mediated at an intermediate level of the visual system. Distance 
dependence of the other putatively high-level judgments is an underexplored yet 
important issue. 
An important omission from this articleʼs list of temporal limits is an aspect of 
percepts that is not thought to be high level, but nonetheless has coarse temporal 
resolution. The perceived brightness of a patch is influenced by the surrounding 
spatial context, as in the simultaneous contrast illusion, where a grey patch on a 
dark background appears much lighter than the same grey on a bright 
background. If the background is alternated between bright and dark, the grey 
alternates in appearance at the same rate, but only up to a background 
alternation rate of about five times per second [47]. This is consistent with other 
evidence that surface appearance involves signals that spread slowly across the 
visual cortex [48-50], and is consistent with the distance effects described in the 
previous paragraph. 
Box 2. Temporal masking and temporal resolution 
The stimulus presentation method of the visual temporal masking literature bears 
a strong resemblance to that of the experiments reviewed in this article. In both, 
two stimuli follow in rapid succession. But instead of alternating between two 
stimuli to be identified as in Movie 1, masking displays usually consist of a non-
repetitive display, with a single target stimulus followed (or preceded) by a neutral 
high-contrast pattern which impairs the visibility of the target. The discussion in 
the “Understanding multiple temporal scales” section of this article explains why 
such experiments do not necessarily reveal temporal resolution.	  Poor temporal 
resolution may nevertheless be the reason for the invisibility, resulting in the 
target integrating with the mask. 
Studies of visual masking currently focus on the more complicated possibility that 
a mask presented at certain times disrupts selected components of target 
processing, such as edge vs. surface processing or feedback vs. feedforward 
mechanisms [51]. Masks could also, rather than integrating (blurring) with the 
target as suggested by the temporal resolution concept, simply terminate target 
processing [52]. The implications for the understanding of the temporal limits 
reviewed here is not understood. Detailed computational models of masking have 
proliferated and are successful in explaining the data from traditional masking 
paradigms	  [53], but they do not seem capable of explaining the temporal limits 
reviewed here. The critical exposure duration for visibility in most masking 
studies is shorter than that for the temporal resolution studies in the slow 
category here, yet longer than that for the temporal resolution studies in the fast 
category. In principle this difference could be due to the presence of low temporal 
frequency information in the non-repetitive masking displays, but this is unlikely 
to explain the differences in every case. The challenge is to create models of 
visual processing that can bridge both paradigms. 
Box 3. Future Questions 
If high-level visual processing has poor temporal resolution, what about inter-
sensory processing? Intensive work has only recently begun on this question, 
with Fujisaki and Nishida [35, 54, 55]	  leading	  the	  way.	  
Why are low temporal resolution processes low temporal resolution? It is not 
understood what aspect of the underlying neural processing is so time-
consuming. 
Low-level luminance mechanisms adapt their integration time somewhat to fit the 
current input [56].	  Do	  higher mechanisms also do so? Or could they rely on fixed 
component mechanisms working simultaneously on different timescales [57] so 
each is available if needed? 
How do visual mechanisms collaborate so harmoniously that most people never 
realize their visual experience comprises disparate rate limits? How do visual 
processing mechanisms with different processing times keep perceptual qualities 
in temporal register? (see [7])	  
 
Figure and Movie Captions 
Figure 1. Temporal limits on visual judgments. Each colored strip represents the 
results of an experiment in which the rate of change of a display was varied to 
determine the maximum rate at which something could be perceived. In a flicker 
perception experiment, the stimulus alternates between two luminance values. 
Flicker is perceived from slow rates up to speeds exceeding 50 Hz, indicated by 
the fading of the strip around that rate. 
Movie 1. Each stripe alternates between leftward-tilted and rightward-titled. The 
orientation of those in the left pair always differs, and the orientation of those in 
the right pair is always the same. This should be easy to perceive at the rate of 
the top display, but in the middle display if the stripes alternate as fast as 
intended, whether the orientations are the same or different should be difficult to 
perceive as the speed limit for this judgment has been exceeded. The bottom 
display illustrates the percept when the alternation is speeded until it exceeds 
even the limit for flicker perception. This bottom display was created by averaging 
the two frames together, as the visual system does at high alternation rates. 
Movie 2. A field of dots moves back and forth and changes between black and 
white with each direction change. At the speed of the top display, it should be 
easy to perceive that when moving leftward, the dots are white. The middle 
display should show the dots alternating at a rate fast enough (greater than 5 
frames per second) that the pairing of motion and color cannot be determined. 
The bottom display illustrates the outcome when the alternation rate exceeds the 
flicker limit so that only the average of the two dot colors—which is the same as 
the background luminance—is perceived. It was created by averaging the two 
frames together, as the visual system does at high alternation rates. 
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